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1 Introduction 
In this paper we review the latest findings on historical wealth concentration in a 
number of Western countries. We also present new series for Scandinavia, and, finally, 
we compare these developments over time. The aim of this comparison is to distinguish 
between common trends on the one hand, and changes which are more likely to be 
country specific, on the other. In particular we revisit the question of whether wealth 
inequality increased in the initial phase of industrialization as well as to what extent 
later stages of development saw a reversal of such a trend. Ultimately the goal is to get 
some new insights about the dynamics of wealth distribution over the path of 
development, which in turn may have implications for countries currently in an early 
stage of development.1 
 
We also believe that there are a number of reasons for why it is especially interesting to 
study the evolution of wealth concentration in Scandinavia compared to other countries. 
First, compared to most of the countries for which data on wealth concentration exist, 
the Scandinavian countries were late to industrialize. This in combination with the fact 
that we have data stretching as far back as to around 1800 means that we can follow 
changes in wealth concentration over the whole transition from before industrialization 
up to present day.2 A second reason for comparing the Scandinavian experience to other 
Western countries is that is the Scandinavian countries are well known to be extremes in 
the spectrum of welfare states and their achievements in terms of equalizing income and 
wealth are well known.3 However, it is not equally established how much of the 
equalization took part before the expansion of the welfare state and, in particular, it is 
                                                 
1 There is a large theoretical literature on the interplay between wealth distribution and development 
which emphasizes wealth distribution as a determinant of individual possibilities to pursue different 
occupations, especially in the presence of credit constraints when assets are essential as collateral or as a 
means of directly financing entrepreneurial undertakings. This literature does not, however, give a 
uniform message about the dynamics of wealth distribution over development. Indeed many recent 
models can be classified according to their predictions about how markets affect the distribution of wealth 
in the long-run (see, e.g., Mookherjee and Ray 2006). Some promote an equalization view, in which the 
intergenerational transmission of wealth causes convergence (e.g., Becker and Tomes 1979, 1986; Loury 
1981). Stiglitz (1969) also showed long-run equalization to be the predicted outcome under quite general 
assumptions in a standard neoclassical framework. Others take the complete opposite view that markets in 
the long-run increase wealth inequality (e.g., Ljungqvist 1993; Mookherjee and Ray 2003). In between 
these extremes we find models which permit both initial inequalities and initial equalities to persist. 
Typically, history determines where a society ends up in the long run view (Banerjee and Newman 1993; 
Galor and Zeira 1993; Aghion and Bolton 1997; Piketty 1997; Matsuyama 2000; and Ghatak and Jiang 
2002). Data on wealth distribution over the transition from agrarian to industrial society is therefore also 
important to evaluate the various theoretical predictions. 
2 The first observation for Sweden is 1800, and for Denmark and Norway 1789. These early estimates are 
due the pioneering work by Soltow (1980, 1981, 1985). In terms of new data our earliest observations are 
1868 for Norway, 1873 for Sweden, and 1908 for Denmark. 
3 See, for example Esping-Andersen’s (1990) famous categorization of different types of welfare states.   2
not clear why it happened.4 Finally, a common theme stressed in several of the recent 
studies is that a number of exogenous shocks to wealth holdings during the first half of 
the twentieth century are the main explanation to the dramatic declines in top wealth 
shares. As Sweden did not take part in the First and Second World Wars and was less 
affected by the Great Depression compared to many other countries, the development of 
wealth concentration over these periods is interesting. If Swedish wealth concentration 
falls at the same time as in other countries, different mechanisms must be at work than 
if Sweden (and other countries not involved in the wars) showed no decline in wealth 
inequality. 
 
We will focus on the most recent studies for France (Piketty et al. 2006), Switzerland 
(Dell et al. 2005), and the US (Kopczuk and Saez 2004), but we also include data on the 
UK from Lindert (1986, 2000) for the nineteenth century and data from Atkinson and 
Harrison (1978), and Atkinson et al. (1989) for the twentieth century as well as data on 
nineteenth century USA wealth distribution from Lindert (2000). Our hope is that 
focusing on these recent studies we can update the parts of the picture given in the 
chapter by Davies and Shorrocks (2000).5 For Scandinavia we rely on new data based 
on wealth tax statistics as well as some new estate tax data. For the case of Sweden 
using new data allows us to construct comparable series from 1908 until today, while 
we for the cases of Denmark and Norway compile data from a number of previous 
publications trying to link comparable estimates. These series are the result of our first 
analysis of the new Scandinavian data and our future work may contain adjusted 
estimates. A more detailed account for the sources is available in the Data appendix. 
2  Recent country studies 
2.1  Some measurement issues 
The main conceptual and measurement issues relevant to the study of the historical 
development of wealth inequality relate to how wealth and wealth holders are defined in 
the sources in the different cases analyzed and to how this matters to the calculation of 
                                                 
4 Spånt (1978) studies Sweden during the period 1920-75 and establishes that wealth shares did fall 
substantially before the expansion of the welfare state. We provide new data for earlier periods as well as 
more details for the period 1920-75 allowing us to draw some new conclusions about when the major 
changes took place. 
5 In a way, these recent studies can be seen as a renewed interest in the long-run development wealth 
concentration, despite the obvious short-comings of early data. As noted by Davies and Shorrocks (2000), 
the emphasis in the past decades had been shifting away from general distributional characteristics to 
causes of individual differences in wealth holdings. Such questions require micro data, typically not 
found before the 1960s, and, therefore, much of the long-term perspective had, until recently, been 
considered, if not less important, then impossible to study due to the lack of data. New research, 
following Piketty (2001), Piketty and Saez (2003) and Atkinson (2004), focusing first on income but then 
also on wealth distribution (some of which we review here) has lately changed this.   3
wealth concentration. More elaborate discussions can be found in, e.g., Davies and 
Shorrocks (2000) and Atkinson (2006).  
 
The definition of wealth in historical sources is most often net wealth (also called net 
worth, net marketable wealth), defined as the sum of real and financial assets less the 
sum of debt. This is the most common concept appearing in the historical tax-based 
sources (i.e., wealth and estate taxes) and the main concept used throughout in this 
chapter. For the postwar years, however, augmented wealth, which is defined as net 
wealth but also including pension wealth (contributions into pension schemes and future 
social security payments), has been proposed as an alternative.  
 
The taxation of wealth and estates provides the most common sources of historical 
wealth data. These fiscal instruments have been levied for centuries and the authorities 
have often been interested not only in collecting the revenues but also to calculate the 
sizes of the respective tax bases. In the present study, the series from France, the UK, 
and the USA are based on the estate tax, specifically on samples of individual estate tax 
returns.6 The wealth data from Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland are instead based on 
the wealth tax, in most cases in the form of tabulated distributions published by each 
country’s tax authorities. Of course, using tax-based statistics are associated with some 
obvious problems such as underreporting and the problems with changing definitions or 
data collection routines over time. On the good side, however, is that tax statistics have 
been available for a long time and often in a similar fashion for very long periods of 
time. Moreover, they are quite comprehensive in their coverage, especially of the top of 
the wealth distribution (unlike, e.g., survey data which are often top-coded). Another 
source of wealth data is surveys, but this is only available for most countries since the 
1960s or later and we, therefore, only include in a few cases for comparative reasons 
distributions.  
 
The definition of wealth holders in the tax statistics, i.e., the tax units, differs across the 
wealth and estate taxes and, therefore, also across the countries studied here. The wealth 
tax (in Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland) uses variants of the household as tax unit, 
which in principle refers to families (i.e., married couples and their under-aged children 
living under the same roof) and single adults who then make up the relevant tax 
population.7 The estate tax data (in France, the UK, and the US) is based on (deceased) 
                                                 
6 These are generally adjusted to reflect the distribution of the living population by use of inverse 
mortality rates for age, sex and social status classes; see Atkinson and Harrison (1978: chapter 3) for a 
thorough description of the estate multiplier method. 
7 It should be noted that households and families are not fully equivalent, e.g., in the, often historical, 
cases when households also include servants and other non-related persons. We disregard these 
distinctions for practical reasons and treat family- and household- based tax systems as essentially 
identical.    4
individuals and hence the tax population consists of all adults.8 The tax unit definition 
actually matters to the distributional estimates as shown by Atkinson and Leigh (2005). 
Unless husbands and wives have equal wealth, individual-based data tend to (but must 
not) give rise to a more unequal wealth distribution than does the household-based data. 
The wealth holder concept also matters when studying wealth inequality trends over 
very long time periods, for example from periods when a significant share of the 
population was represented by slaves, unfree women or improperly registered 
immigrants. Shammas (1993) shows that the US historical wealth concentration is 
different depending on how one chooses to include these different subgroups into the 
reference tax population. Our aim has been to use whichever historical estimate that 
generates the highest degree of consistency over time for all countries. 
2.2 France 
The long-run evolution of French wealth inequality is a particularly interesting case to 
study given the important role of the country to Europe’s economic and political 
development. In a recent study, Piketty et al. (2006) presented new data on wealth 
concentration for Paris and France over an almost two hundred year-long period, from 
the Napoleonic era up to today. No previous study on any country has produced such a 
long homogenous time series offering a complete coverage of the effects of 
industrialization on wealth inequality. The French wealth data comes from estate sizes 
collected in relation to an estate tax which was established in 1791 and maintained for 
more than two centuries. For every tenth year during 1807-1902, the authors manually 
collected all estate tax returns recorded in the city of Paris—Paris was chosen both for 
practical reasons but also because it hosted a disproportionally large share of the 
wealthy in France. Using summary statistics on the national level for the estate tax 
returns, the top Paris wealth shares were ‘extrapolated’ to the national level. For the 
post-1902 period, tabulated estate size distributions published by French tax authorities 
were used. 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the wealth shares for some fractiles within the top 
wealth decile in Paris (1807-1902) and France (1947-94). The estimates are from the 
population of the dead, i.e., the one received from analyzing the estate tax returns 
directly, but comparisons with the equivalent wealth shares for the distribution of the 
living population (computed using estate multipliers) reveals practically identical trends 
and levels.9 The figure shows that wealth concentration increased significantly for the 
top 1 and 0.1 percentiles over the nineteenth century, first slowly up to the 1870s when 
                                                 
8 An additional problem is that the age cut-off may vary across countries and even within countries over 
time, which could introduce measurement errors and problems of comparability. 
9 Using data in Piketty et al. (2004: tables A2 and A4) over top wealth shares for both the dead and living 
populations in Paris and France, it is evident that the trends in wealth shares over time is practically the 
same for all fractiles and even the levels do not differ much, on average 0.4 per cent for the top decile and 
5.1 per cent for the top percentile.   5
it increased at a faster pace until its peak at the eve of the First World War. By contrast, 
the two lower groups in the top decile are much less volatile during the period. The 
bottom 5 per cent (P90-95) held about 9 per cent of total wealth until the First World 
War when its share started to increase slowly up to the double of that size by the 1980s. 
The next 4 per cent (P95-99) stayed put on a level around 27 per cent of total wealth 
throughout the entire period of analysis. These patterns suggest that the French 
industrialization, which took off around mid-century, greatly affected personal wealth 
and that it did so already after a couple of decades, but only in the absolute top. This 
conclusion is further supported by two other observations. First, the composition of top 
wealth went from being dominated by real estate assets (mainly land and palaces) in the 
first half of the century to being dominated by financial assets (cash, stocks and bonds), 
which were supposedly held by successful industrialists and their financiers. Second, 
over the same period the share of aristocrats among top wealth holders decreased from 
about 40 per cent to about 10 per cent.10 From the First World War to the end of the 
Second World War, top wealth shares declined sharply, which according to Piketty 
(2003) is directly linked to the shocks to top capital holdings that inflation, bankruptcies 
and destructions meant. The postwar era was quieter with regard to changes in the 
wealth concentration, although its decline continued most likely in relation to the 
increase of progressive taxation (Piketty et al. 2006). 







































Source: Piketty et al. (2004: tables A3 and A7). 
2.3 Switzerland 
Switzerland is an interesting point of reference to any cross-country analysis of 
industrialized countries because of its specific institutional setting with little central 
government interference and low overall levels of taxation. Also Switzerland did not 
                                                 
10 These two facts are shown in Piketty et al. (2006: figures 4-6).   6
take part in either of the world wars. Data on the Swiss concentration of wealth are 
based on wealth tax returns compiled by tax authorities for disparate years between 
1913 and 1997 (Dell et al. 2005). The Swiss wealth tax was levied on a highly irregular 
basis and the authors have spliced several different point estimates from local as well as 
federal estimates in order to get a fairly continuous series for the whole country.  










































Source: Dell et al. (2005: table 3). 
 
Figure 2 depicts top wealth shares within the Swiss top wealth decile over the twentieth 
century. In stark contrast to all the other countries surveyed in this study, wealth 
concentration in Switzerland appears to have been basically constant throughout the 
entire period. The wealth shares at the top of the distribution have decreased but the 
movements are definitely small compared to all other countries studied.11 This does not 
only refer to the top decile vis-à-vis the rest of the population, but perhaps most 
strikingly also to the concentration of wealth within the top. The highest percentile and 
the top 0.1 percentile have not gained or lost considerably compared the bottom nine per 
cent of the top decile, except for some short-run fluctuations. It is not obvious how to 
account for this long-term stability in terms of the country’s relatively low level of 
wealth taxation, nor can the fact that Switzerland stayed out of  both of the world wars 
alone account for this, as Sweden which also escaped both world wars does not share 
the Swiss pattern of development of the wealth distribution. In any case, taken at face 
value the Swiss top wealth share series seriously question the hypothesis that significant 
economic development always lead to a lower level of wealth inequality over time for 
reasons of either redistribution or simply relatively quicker accumulation of household 
wealth among the middle class. 
                                                 
11 A simple trend regression yields small but significant negative coefficients.   7
2.4 United  Kingdom 
The historical data on UK wealth concentration are available from before the country’s 
industrialization. Prior to the twentieth century, however, data are collected from 
scattered samples of probate records and occasional tax assessments (see Lindert 1986, 
2000) and it was not until the Inland Revenue Statistics started publishing compilations 
of estate tax returns after the First World War the time series are fully reliable (see 
Atkinson and Harrison 1978; Atkinson et al. 1989).12 It should be noted that the 
geographical unit of analysis changes over time, with pre-Second World War numbers 
almost always being England and Wales while the postwar ones reflect all of the UK 
Data in Atkinson et al. (1989: table 1) show, however, that the differences between 
these entities are fairly small which is why we do not emphasize these differences in the 
discussion below. 









































England and Wales (1740-1937) U.K. (1938-)
 
Sources: See data appendix. 
 
When England industrialized in the second half of the eighteenth century, the build-up 
of personal wealth also changed. Looking at the overall wealth concentration in Figure 3 
it is evident that there is great heterogeneity within the top 5 per cent of the 
distribution.13 Apparently, wealth concentration at the very top increased while, by 
contrast, the wealth share of the next 4 per cent saw its wealth share decline during the 
same period. Using supplementary evidence on personal wealth, Lindert (1986, 2000) 
shows that wealth gaps were indeed increasing in the absolute top during the nineteenth 
century, with large landlords and merchants on the winning side. At the same time, 
                                                 
12 Some sources of variation remain, however, such as the fact that for 1911/13 estate multipliers were 
only based on age whereas they from 1923 onwards were based on both age and sex. 
13 The reader should keep in mind that this figure, and several others in this study, contains spliced series 
coming from different sources which naturally may impede the degree of homogeneity over time.   8
Lindert points out that the middle-class (i.e., those between the 60th and 95th wealth 
percentiles) were also building up a stock of personal wealth, and this is probably what 
is causing the drop in the share of the next 4 per cent in Figure 3.  
 
After the First World War, the pattern was the reversed. While the top percentile wealth 
share dropped dramatically from almost 70 per cent of total wealth in 1913 to less than 
20 per cent in 1980, the share of the next 4 remained stable and even gained relative the 
rest of the population. Atkinson et al. (1989) argue that this development was driven by 
several factors, but that the evolution of share prices, the ratio of consumer durables and 
owner-occupied housing (i.e., popular wealth) to the value of other wealth were the 
most important ones. According to the most recent statistics from the Inland Revenue, 
the top 1 per cent wealth share has increased by about one third between 1990 and 2003, 
but this increase has not yet been explained by researchers. Possibly, it reflects the surge 
in share prices following the financial market deregulation of the 1980s (the ‘Big 
Bang’) as the financial wealth are most concentrated to the absolute top of the wealth 
distribution.14 
2.5 United  States 
The historical development of wealth concentration in the US has been extensively 
studied by economists and historians and inequality estimates are available back to the 
time of the American Revolution. In this study, we combine pieces of evidence to create 
long (fairly) homogenous series of wealth inequality for the US There are, of course, 
several problems with the final series concerning consistency and comparability over 
time (for reasons discussed in section 3.1) and for the twentieth century we compare 
complementary series based on different sources and definitions of wealth to get an idea 
of how large these problems may be. 
 
In Figure 4, the evolution of the US top wealth decile is shown over the period 1774-
2000 with the top percentile drawn from two different distributions:  adults and 
households. Specifically, the top wealth shares for adults in 1774 come from Shammas 
(1993), who in turn adjusted earlier estimates of Alice Hanson Jones by adding unfree 
men and women to the reference total population, and for the years 1916-2000 from 
Kopczuk and Saez (2004) who use federal estate tax returns. For the household 
distribution, data come from Shammas (1993), Lindert (2000) and various twentieth 
century estimates by Wolff (1987, forthcoming).15 The two top percentile series seem 
inversely U-shaped over the period, with wealth shares increasing slowly between the 
late eighteenth and the mid-nineteenth century but then much faster between 1860 and 
1929, when they more than doubled. The long-run pattern of the lower 9 per cent of the 
                                                 
14 This is a stylized fact which is true for many developed countries (see, e.g., the overview of ‘stylized 
facts’ in Davies and Shorrocks 2000).  
15 While the pre-Second World War data are mainly drawn from censuses, the post-1962 observations 
from Wolff (1987, forthcoming) are based on survey material.   9
top wealth decile, however, exhibit stable or even decreasing shares of total wealth 
(although based on rather few observations). This observed inequality increase in the 
absolute top coincides with the industrialization era in the US around the mid-nineteenth 
century. Although the few pre-First World War estimates are uncertain, their basic 
message are supported by other researchers using other sources. For example, 
Rosenbloom and Stutes (2005) also find in their cross-sectional individual analysis of 
the 1870 census that regions with a relatively high share of its workforce in 
manufacturing were relatively more unequal as regards the distribution of wealth (see 
also Moehling and Steckel 2001). Another anecdotal piece of evidence in support for a 
linkage between industrialization and increased inequality is that the fifteen richest 
Americans in 1915 were industrialists from the oil, steel and railroad industries and their 
financiers from the financial sector.16  








































Sources: See Data appendix. 
 
The twentieth century development in Figure 4 suggests that wealth concentration 
peaked just before the Great Depression in 1929-30, when the financial holdings of the 
rich were highly valued on the markets. In the depression years, however, top wealth 
shares plummeted as stocks lost almost two-thirds of their real values. Kopczuk and 
Saez (2004) show that among corporate equity represented more than half of the net 
wealth of the top 0.1 percentile wealth holders in 1929. Another contributing factor to 
the wealth compression was surely the redistributive policies in the New Deal. After the 
Second World War, the top percentile wealth shares remained low until the 1980s when 
the top household percentile’s share increased significantly, peaking around mid-late 
1990s and then to decline somewhat in 2001 (Wolff forthcoming). By contrast, the top 
adult percentile wealth share from the estate series in Kopczuk and Saez (2004) exhibits 
                                                 
16 See the listing of the top 20 fortunes in 1915 by De Long (1996).   10
no such increase, which is surprising given that this period also saw a well-documented 
surge in US top incomes (Piketty and Saez 2003). Whether the difference in trends 
between the household and adult distributions reflects inconsistencies in the data or 
some deeper dissimilarity in the relation between income and wealth accumulation 
remains to be examined by future research.  
2.6 Denmark 
For Denmark, there exist historical estimates of the country’s concentration of wealth 
from as early as 1789 and then more frequently from the beginning of the twentieth 
century onwards. The comparability of these observations is not perfect and the 
composite series must thus be interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, this paper is the first 
to present a full range of wealth inequality estimates from the periods before, during and 
after the industrialization of Denmark that took place in the late nineteenth century. The 
earliest data for Danish wealth concentration come from a comprehensive national 
wealth tax assessment in 1789, from which Soltow (1981) has collected a large 
individual sample of the gross wealth of households. After this year, however, there is a 
gap in the data until the early twentieth century when the modern wealth tax had been 
introduced. For 1908-25, Zeuthen (1928) lists tabulated wealth distributions (number of 
households and their wealth sums in different wealth size classes) for Danish 
households, adjusted so as to include also those households with no taxable wealth. 
Similar tabulated wealth tax-based data are published in Bjerke (1956) for 1939, 1944, 
and 1949 and in various official statistical publications of Statistics Denmark for a few 
years thereafter until the wealth tax was abolished in 1997.17 
 
Figure 5 shows the wealth shares of groups within the top decile between 1789 and 
1996. The lowest 5 per cent (P90-95) exhibits a flat trend up to 1908 and thereafter 
doubles its share from 10 to 20 per cent over the twentieth century. The next 4 per cent 
(P95-99) lies constant between 25 and 30 per cent of total wealth over the entire period 
whereas the top percentile (P99-100) decreases significantly over the period, with 
particularly marked decreases after the two world wars. When looking at the very top of 
the distribution, the top 0.1 percentile (P99.9-100), there is no decrease at all up to 1915, 
but instead there is a dramatic drop by almost two-thirds of the wealth share between 
1915 and 1925. Overall, the Danish wealth concentration decreased over the course of 
industrialization and this continued throughout the twentieth century, although the 
development was not uniform at all times and across all groups.  
 
Explaining the wealth compression of the Danish industrialization can be done by 
comparing the identities of the Danish top wealth holders before and after the late 
                                                 
17 The estimates in 1995 and 1996 were constructed from only the tabulated number of wealth holders 
(families) and the total net wealth in the whole country. Supplementary Danish top wealth shares exist for 
the 1980s in Bentzen and Schmidt-Sørensen (1994), but unfortunately wealth size has been top-coded in 
their data and the resulting estimates are not fully comparable with the other tax-based data.   11
nineteenth century. In 1789, the dominant groups in the top of the wealth distribution 
were owners of large agricultural estates. Soltow (1981: 126) cites an historical source 
saying that ‘some 300 Danish landlords owned about 90 per cent of the Danish soil’. By 
contrast, in 1925 the group with the largest private fortunes was the stock brokers 
(Veksellerere) although landlords (Godsejere, Proprietærer og Storforpagterere) were 
still wealthy, both groups having more than fifty times larger average wealth than the 
country average.18  







































Source: See Data appendix. 
 
The drops in top wealth shares after the two world wars were partly associated the 
sharply progressive wartime wealth taxes.19 According to Bjerke (1956: 140), however, 
the fall after the Second World War was also largely due to new routines in the 
collection and valuation of wealth information of the tax authorities, which in particular 
made middle-class wealth more visible. Towards the end of the century, the wealth 
concentration continued declining up to the 1980s, largely due to increased share of the 
relatively equally distributed house-ownership in the total portfolio 
(Lavindkomstkommissionen 1979: chapter 5), but thereafter started to increase up to the 
mid 1990s.  
2.7 Norway 
As for the case of Denmark, the data on Norwegian wealth concentration also come 
mostly from various kinds of wealth taxation. The first observation is from 1789, when 
the wealth tax assessment that also was launched in Denmark came into place (the two 
                                                 
18 The average net personal wealth in 1925 was Danish kronor (DKR) 6,826 for all of Denmark, 
DKR 366,000 for brokers and DKR 359,000 for large landlords (Zeuthen 1928: 447).  
19 On the historical development of Danish wealth taxation, see Christensen (2003: 8, 14).    12
countries were in a political union at this time). As in the Danish case, both real and 
personal assets were taxed, including land, houses or farms, factories, livestock, mills, 
shops inventories and financial instruments. Debt was not taxed, and hence the wealth 
concept is gross wealth.20 Our second observation is from 1868, when the Norwegian 
government launched a national wealth tax assessment. Mohn (1873) presents totals for 
wealth and households and a tabulation of the wealth held by the top 0.27 per cent 
(P99.73-100) of all households, including a detailed listing of the fifteen overall largest 
fortunes.21 For 1912, we use wealth tax returns from the taxation of 1913-14 
(exempting financial wealth) which are presented in tabulated form in Statistics Norway 
(1915b).22 Similarly, for 1930 we use tabulated wealth distributions (number of wealth 
holders in wealth classes along with totals for wealth and tax units) presented in 
Statistics Norway (1934). From 1948 onwards, we use the tabulation of wealth holders 
and wealth sums in wealth classes published in the Statistical Yearbook various years. 
In the early 1980s the wealth statistics started being reporting for individual taxpayers 
instead of, as before, for households. In order to keep our series as consistent as 
possible, we attempted to convert the post-1982 observations from reflecting the 
individual distribution to reflect the household distribution using a listing of both types 
by Statistics Norway for the year of 1979.23 
 
Figure 6 presents the trends in Norwegian wealth concentration between 1789 and 2002. 
The figure shows the top wealth decile broken up into the bottom 5 per cent (P90-95) of 
wealth holders, the next 4 per cent (P95-99), the top percentile, as well as the top 0.1 
percentile. According to these fractiles, Norway’s top wealth holders experienced quite 
different trends in their relative positions over the period. As for the bottom 5 per cent 
of the top decile, its share decreases between 1789 and 1912 and then jumps up sharply 
between 1912 and 1930 to land on a fairly stable (though slowly declining) level 
thereafter. The wealth share of the next 4 per cent, exhibits an inverse-U shaped pattern, 
increasing sometime in the nineteenth century (we do not know exactly when due to a 
lack of data), peaking in 1930 and then declining almost monotonically over the 
 
                                                 
20 We use Soltow’s (1980) distributional estimates based on ‘males or families aged 26 and older’, which 
is not identical to what is used for latter years and probably implies that the 1789 inequality should be 
adjusted upwards to be fully comparable.  
21 There is no information about whether it was the gross or net wealth which was taxed. 
22 We use tables of wealth holders in wealth classes in Statistics Norway (1915b: 20-21), corroborated by 
information about reference wealth and tax unit totals in Statistics Norway (1915a: 13f) and Kiær (1917: 
22). The fact that financial assets were exempt in the Norwegian wealth taxation before 1922 is discussed 
in Statistics Norway (1934: 1). 
23 The Statistical Yearbook of Norway of 1981 tabulates the net wealth of both households (table 380: 
316) and personal taxpayers (table 368: 306). In the latter case, however, we have no data on the sum of 
personal wealth of all wealth holders in each wealth class. We therefore insert the sums of wealth 
observed in household case into the individual case for the exact corresponding wealth classes. The 
comparison of wealth shares across these two distributions shows that the individual distribution produces 
shares that are 25%, 21%, 30%, 44% and 60% higher than the household distribution for the top 10%, 
5%, 1%, 0.1%, 0.01% fractiles, respectively.   13











































Source: See the Data appendix. 
 
rest of the twentieth century. Finally, the share of the top wealth percentile decreases 
significantly between 1789 and 1868, both dates being before Norway’s 
industrialization period. The share then goes up to slightly 1912 only to start decreasing 
again. In fact, the most dramatic falls occur in the postwar period, with the top 
percentile dropping from 34.6 per cent to 18.5 per cent during 1948-1979 and the top 
0.1 percentile going from 13.2 per cent to 5.7 per cent over the same period. In the 
1990s, there is a rapid recovery which may be related to the oil fortunes being built up 
in recent times, as well as to the rise in prices on world stock markets that produces a 
rise in the top shares in other countries over this period. The sizeable increase between 
1997 and 1998 can also be explained by a change in the Norwegian tax laws specifying 
an increase in the assessed values of corporate stock on people’s personal tax returns.24 
 
Despite the seeming disparate trends among Norway’s top wealth holders, the evidence 
presented in Figure 6 corresponds well with the official economic and political history 
of Norway over this period. The Norwegian economy was badly hit by the economic 
crisis after the Napoleonic and there was a shift in the political power from the great 
landlords and landed nobility to a class of civil servants.25 When merchant shipping 
expanded in the world after 1850 Norwegian ship owners and manufacturers 
experienced a tremendous economic boost. When looking at the average wealth of 
various occupations in 1868 listed in Mohn (1873: 24), the four richest groups were 
                                                 
24 The tax-assessed values of stocks were raised in 1998, for stocks listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange 
from 75% to 100% of the market value and for non-listed stocks from 30% to 65% of an assumed market 
value. 
25 Historical account taken from the section on Norway’s history during ‘The Napoleonic Wars and the 
19th Century’ in Encylopædia Britannica Online.   14
manufacturers (having 160 times the country average household wealth), merchants 
(124 times), ship owners (96 times) and civil servants (87 times). Half a century later, in 
1930, a similar comparison between the wealth of top occupations groups and the 
country average was made (Statistics Norway 1934: 6), and only ship owners had kept 
the distance to the rest of the population (having 119 times the country average wealth), 
while merchants (22 times) and manufacturers (19 times) had lost wealth relative to the 
average. 
2.8 Sweden 
Recent studies of wealth distribution in Sweden have mainly used data from household 
surveys collected in the last three decades (see, e.g., Bager-Sjögren and Klevmarken 
1998; Klevmarken 2004).26 The only previous comprehensive studies on the Swedish 
historical wealth concentration are those by Spånt (1978, 1979), which are based on 
wealth tax statistics and published in the Censuses and some special public 
investigations of the wealth distribution, covering the period 1920-75.27 Wealth is 
defined as share of net-worth (taxation values). We extend these available data both in 
scope and detail, first by complementing the years covered by Spånt with a number of 
years for which we have found satisfactory reference totals for ‘total wealth’ and data 
on distribution (sometimes only for the very top of the distribution as in 1937) in the tax 
statistics. Moreover, we present new series using the same type of tax data for as long as 
it remains available, which is the period 1978-93. Hence, we are able to construct fully 
homogenous series of wealth concentration over the period 1920-93, which is the 
longest available series for Sweden so far. We also add to these series observations 
based on similar data for the years 2000-02.28  
 
We complement the wealth tax returns based series with new data coming from estate 
tax material for 1873-77, 1906-08, 1954/55, 1967, and 2002-0329 as well as with a 
number of alternative series for wealth concentration over the past decades.30 We also 
                                                 
26 The main data source in these studies the panel survey database HUS (for more information see web 
page http://www.nek.uu.se/faculty/klevmark/hus.htm) 
27 The material used was the censuses for 1920, 1930, 1935, 1945, 1951 and surveys done in 1966, 1970, 
1975. The surveys oversampled rich households so coverage for studying wealth concentration is likely to 
be good in these studies. For previous periods Soltow (1985) also reports data for the year 1800. 
28 The data for 2000-02 is taken from the LINDA database, which in turn relies on wealth tax returns 
(Longitudinal INdividual DAta for Sweden, LINDA is a register-based longitudinal data set intended to 
complement survey databases used in much of the previous work on wealth distribution in Sweden, see 
web-page http://linda.nek.uu.se/ for more on LINDA). 
29 The sources of the estate data are Finansdepartementet (1879, 1910) and SOU (1957, 1969, 2004). The 
1908 wealth data are based on applying the estate multiplier method to the estate data, see 
Finansdepartementet (1910: 14-34). 
30 The main complements for the past decades are series from Statistics Sweden based on their HINK-
database. This is a population sample where data on wealth is taken from the taxation material and other 
administrative records using the same household definition as we do in our main series (counting 
individuals over the age of 18 as individual units even if they still live with their parents). This household   15
add the observation for the year 1800 made by Soltow (1985).31 Overall, we believe our 
series give a good sense of the evolution of wealth concentration in Sweden at least 
from the beginning of the twentieth century until present day. We also note that wealth 
tax data and estate tax data indicate similar patterns of development over the twentieth 
century. 
 
Looking first at the pattern over the nineteenth century, our observations indicate a 
relatively stable wealth distribution which by today’s standards was very unequal. As 
there are no observations between 1800-73 there is little that can be said about the 
development over this period but given the fact that industrialization is typically 
considered to have started around 1850 and to have accelerated around 1870, we do not, 
a priori, think that we miss any major changes in the wealth distribution relating to the 
industrialization.   
 
Over the twentieth century the picture is much clearer. We can draw on multiple sources 
which overlap in time and, even though there is still uncertainty about the levels over 
time, the trends seem relatively certain. The long run trend in wealth concentration in 
Sweden over the twentieth century is that the top decile has seen its wealth share drop 
substantially, from around 90 per cent in the early decades of the century, to around 53 
per cent around 1980, and then recovering slightly to a level around 60 per cent in 
recent years. Looking just at this general trend is, however, incomplete if one is to really 
comprehend the evolution of wealth concentration. Decomposing the top decile and 
looking separately at the top per cent (P99-100) and the 9 per cent below that (P90-99), 
we see that the majority of the top decile actually experiences substantial gains in 
wealth shares over the first half of the century. The overall drop in the top decile share 
is explained by such dramatic decreases in the top percentile share that this outweighs 
the increase for the P90-99 group. In the period 1950-80 both groups experiences 
declines in wealth shares but the decrease is larger for the top percentile and after 1980 
the trend is again the same for both groups but now the gains in wealth shares are 
somewhat larger for the top percentile.  
 
Looking at decompositions of wealth shares in Figure 7, the Swedish wealth distribution 
exhibits a ‘Kuznets-type pattern’ over the first eighty years of the twentieth century, 
with a gradual spread of increasing shares to lower fractiles beginning with the biggest 
                                                                                                                                               
definition is the main difference between HINK and HUS, a much used detailed household survey but 
with a relatively small sample, where instead ‘kosthushåll’ is used, meaning roughly that everyone living 
together counts as one household. This difference is the major source of discrepancies between estimates 
from the two sources. The fact that individuals over the age of 18 who live with their parents form 
separate households in HINK (and in our historical data) means that we get a substantial number of 
observations of with very low wealth but who still may enjoy access to the wealth of their parents. This is 
potentially problematic if we are concerned with issues of living standards but not if we want to estimate 
the distribution of wealth (in terms of ownership and control). 
31 This observation is based a wealth census carried out in the year 1800 and describes the wealth 
distribution for the population of males aged 20 and older.   16
increases in the wealth share of the P95-99 group before 1930 (even P99-99.5 increases 
until 1930), followed by increases for P90-95 up until the end of the Second World 
War, and then continued and large increases for the rest of the population (P0-90) after 
that.  
Figure 7: Top 10% wealth shares in Sweden, split up into a bottom 9% (P90-99) and a 



































P99-100 (wealth tax based) P90-99 (wealth tax based) P99-100 (SCB, 1975-2000)
P90-99 (SCB, 1975-2000) P99-100 (estate based) P90-99 (estate based)
P99-100 (Spånt, 1920-75) P90-99 (Spånt, 1920-1975)  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
How can we account for these developments? Focusing first at the decreases in the very 
top of the distribution over the first half of the century we note that most of the decrease 
takes place between 1930 and 1950, with the sharpest falls in the early 1930s—a time of 
financial turbulence and in particular the Kreuger-crash—and just after the Second 
World War.32 The period just after 1945 was a time when many of the reforms 
discussed in the 1930s, but put on hold by the war were expected to happen and 
politically the Communist Party gained ground forcing the Social Democratic Party to 
move to the left.33 In particular, the progressive taxes that had been pushed up during 
the war remained high and also affected wealth holdings as Sweden had a joint income 
and wealth tax until 1948. However, the main reason for the decreasing share in the 
very top is likely to be the increasing share for the lower nine per cent of the top decile 
and this in turn is likely to be increased wealth accumulation among relatively well paid 
individuals. After 1945 the trend of increased accumulation of continues down the 
distribution. Over the next thirty years the most important change is the increased share 
of owner occupied housing in total wealth which increases from being 17 per cent of all 
                                                 
32 While Sweden was not as affected by the Great Depression as many other countries, the so called 
Kreuger-crash in 1932, the bankruptcy of Ivar Kruger’s industrial empire, led to major loses of wealth in 
Sweden. Just as an indication of the importance of this event 18 per cent of all bank lending in Sweden at 
the time was to companies controlled by Kreuger. 
33 See, for example, Steinmo (1993).   17
wealth to 45 per cent in 1975 and remains around that in 1997 when adding owner 
occupied apartments and houses, and vacations homes (consumer durables also 
increased a lot but stay a relatively small share of the total).34 Even if this type of 
wealth was far from evenly accumulated across the distribution it accrued to relatively 
large groups in the distribution causing wealth concentration to keep falling. Today 
about half of all households in Sweden own their own home. Over the past decades 
fluctuations in wealth shares depend largely on movements in real estate prices and 
share prices. Increases in the former has a tendency to push up the share of the upper 
half of the distribution at the expense of the very top causing inequality to go down, 
while increases in share prices makes the very top share larger due to share ownership 
still being very concentrated causing inequality to increase. In the year 1997 the top 
percentile in the wealth distribution owns 62 per cent of all privately held shares and the 
top 5 per cent holds 90 per cent.35 
2.9  Comparing the long-run wealth concentration across countries 
Above we have presented a compilation of recent as well as some new evidence on the 
long-run evolution of wealth inequality in seven Western countries: France, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. 
Figure 8 shows the top wealth percentile in each of these countries for various periods 
during 1740-2003. Even though, as we have stressed repeatedly, great caution should be 
taken when comparing these series we still believe that some conclusions can be drawn 
about the developments of wealth inequality in these countries over the past two 
hundred years. 
 
Two broad results can be drawn from the series. First, we do not think that the evidence 
unambiguously supports the idea that wealth inequality increases in the early stages of 
industrialization. Looking at the development of the wealth share of the top percentile 
among the countries analyzed here, the Scandinavian observations exhibit slightly 
falling (Denmark and Norway) or fairly stable (Sweden) inequality levels over the 
initial stages of industrialization (in the late nineteenth century). The UK series 
(England and Wales) show increasing wealth shares for the top percentile in the period 
of the two industrial revolutions (1740-1911), as do the US and French series over the 
nineteenth century. Looking instead at the next 4 per cent (P95-99) these series 
increased slightly in Norway and Denmark as well as in France and the US, stayed 
relatively stable in Sweden but decreased markedly in the UK, see Table 2 and Figure 9. 
The overall pattern, hence, is mixed and also depends on which part of the top one looks 
at. Overall this suggests that going from a rural to an industrial society, with entirely 
new stocks and types of wealth being created, may, but does not necessarily, give rise to 
a large increase in wealth concentration. It also suggests that carefully studying smaller 
                                                 
34 See Spånt (1979: 78-80) and Statistics Sweden (2000: 19-21).  
35 Statistics Sweden (2000: 38-40).   18
fractiles of the distribution is necessary to get a more complete picture of the 
development.  










































Sources: See Table 1 and the Data appendix. 
Table 1: Top 1% (P99-100) wealth shares in Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and United States, 1740-2003 





1740           43.6     
1774             28.0 18.0 
1789 56.0    47.0           
1800       51.9       
1807  43.4             
1810           54.9     
1817  44.5             
1827  45.2             
1837  43.8             
1847  47.9             
1857  49.5             
1860             21.0 
1867  48.0             
1868     36.0           
1875           61.1     
1877  47.1             
1887  48.7             
1890             25.8 
1902  51.6             
1903  51.6             
1904  54.4             
1905  58.1               19





1906  59.8             
1907  54.5             
1908  46.3     53.5       
1909  56.8             
1910  54.4             
1911    57.7       69.0    
1912  57.1  37.2           
1913  54.9             
1915  47.0     42.3     
1916             38.1   
1917 44.1            35.6   
1918 43.6            36.8   
1919 42.6        36.4    39.9   
1920  37.2     51.5     37.6   
1921 39.7        38.1    35.2   
1922 39.6            36.0  36.7 
1923 39.9          60.9  35.2   
1924 39.3          59.9  36.7   
1925 38.7 44.6      40.7 61.0  36.0   
1926  45.1        57.3  35.1   
1927  47.6        59.8  39.2   
1928           57.0  36.5   
1929  50.2      42.0 55.5  36.8  44.2 
1930  50.3  37.6  50.0  57.9  40.3  
1931    46.5        34.7   
1932    44.8        28.4   
1933    44.9        30.3  33.3 
1934         40.4    28.1   
1935    46.1  42.8     27.8   
1936  45.8      40.1  54.2  29.7   
1937    42.6  42.7     27.0   
1938  42.0      44.4  55.0  27.1   
1939  41.7  42.9        26.0  36.4 
1940    38.7     40.4   25.3   
1941    34.9     41.5   25.3   
1942    36.9        23.7   
1943    36.8        24.3   
1944  39.2  38.3        25.5   
1945    35.3  37.7 37.1   24.7  29.8 
1946    30.7  37.7     24.5   
1947    29.9  34.7 38.3   24.3   
1948  30.4  34.6  34.1      23.0   
1949  31.3  34.0  33.2 37.8   22.6 27.1 
1950  29.6  33.6  32.8  47.2  22.8  
1951  29.7  33.0  32.2 39.0 45.8    
1952  29.4  32.3       43.0    
1953 29.5 32.6      40.0 43.6  23.8  31.2   20





1954 29.3 30.5        45.3  23.2   
1955  29.5  31.5     41.5 44.5    
1956 27.1 30.4        44.5  24.7   
1957  27.2  32.3     41.9 43.4    
1958 27.1 30.1        41.4  24.2   
1959  27.9  31.9       41.4    
1960 26.4 29.5  25.5     33.9  25.2   
1961 26.7          36.5     
1962 26.9 30.3       31.4  24.4  31.8 
1963  27.2            
1964  27.6  31.3       34.5    
1965 24.2          33.0  24.7  34.4 
1966  24.8     23.4    30.6    
1967 24.6          31.4     
1968           33.6     
1969         41.6  31.1  22.9 31.1 
1970  24.8     20.1    29.7    
1971 25.5          28.4     
1972 25.3          31.7  23.1  29.1 
1973     21.5      27.3     
1974           22.6     
1975  25.9     20.7    22.7    
1976     19.5      24.4  19.3 19.9 
1977           22.1     
1978       19.4    20.0    
1979     18.5  17.1    20.0    20.5 
1980       19.0    19.0    
1981       16.2 33.0 18.0    
1982      18.0 17.3    18.0 19.1   
1983     17.5  18.1   20.0  21.1  33.8 
1984  21.6  18.0  16.5  18.0  21.0  
1985      18.9 16.5    18.0 22.4   
1986      18.7 16.2    18.0 22.7   
1987      18.7 16.2    18.0 21.6   
1988      18.9 18.6    17.0 21.7   
1989     18.9  19.7   17.0  22.0  37.4 
1990      18.8 16.2    18.0 20.9   
1991     18.8  16.0 33.6 17.0  21.5   
1992     17.5  16.5   18.0  21.2  37.2 
1993       17.8    18.0  21.3   
1994  21.3  19.9      19.0  21.6   
1995 26.9    20.0     19.0  21.5  38.5 
1996 27.2    20.6      20.0  21.4   
1997     21.6    34.8  22.0  21.2   
1998     25.9      22.0  21.7 38.1 
1999     26.4      23.0  21.7   
2000      26.6 19.5    23.0 20.8     21





2001     25.2  17.8    22.0    33.4 
2002     25.4  18.4    24.0     
2003           21.0     
Sources: See the Data appendix. 
 
Table 2: Next 4% (P95-99) wealth shares in Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and United States, 1740-2003 
Year Denmark  France  Norway  Sweden  Switzerland UK 
USA 
(households) 
1740         43.3   
1774            23.0 
1789 24.0    23.0         
1800       38.7       
1807  26.8           
1810         30.4   
1817  27.4           
1827  27.9           
1837  27.4           
1847  24.5           
1857  25.0           
1860            28.0 
1867  24.7           
1875         22.9   
1877  28.9           
1887  28.5           
1902  23.9           
1903  23.8           
1904  23.8           
1905  22.4           
1906  21.3           
1907  24.0           
1908 31.7      21.7       
1909  22.4           
1910  23.6           
1911  22.5  32.0      18.0   
1912  22.1           
1913  23.3           
1915  27.2     26.4    
1916             
1917  27.9           
1918  26.7           
1919  26.9     25.9    
1920 29.0      27.7       
1921  27.8     25.9      22
Year Denmark  France  Norway  Sweden  Switzerland UK 
USA 
(households) 
1922  29.0           
1923  28.3       21.1   
1924  28.2       21.6   
1925 29.4 24.6      23.9  21.1   
1926  23.9        22.6   
1927  22.8        21.5   
1928         22.6   
1929  21.7      24.6  23.4   
1930    21.3 33.0 27.3    21.3   
1931  22.8           
1932  23.3           
1933  23.6           
1934       27.5    
1935  22.6    28.0       
1936  22.4      28.0  23.2   
1937  23.7           
1938  23.2      28.9  22.2   
1939 28.8 23.5           
1940    26.0    27.2    
1941    27.2    27.9    
1942  26.0           
1943  26.4           
1944 29.2 26.5           
1945  26.8    28.3  27.2     
1946  25.8    28.1       
1947  25.5    28.7  27.1     
1948    26.5 27.8 29.0       
1949 26.9 25.4    28.7  27.2     
1950  26.4  26.5    27.8  27.2   
1951 26.3 25.7    26.8 27.3 27.9   
1952 26.3 27.4        27.4   
1953 26.2 28.3      26.6  27.7   
1954 26.1 27.6        26.7   
1955 25.7 27.4      25.8  27.0   
1956 24.6 25.9        27.1   
1957 24.6 25.4      25.5  25.7   
1958 24.8 24.8        26.8   
1959 24.7 24.9        26.1   
1960 23.9 24.7  25.5      25.6   
1961  23.9       24.3   
1962 23.8 24.9        23.5  21.3 
1963  23.6           
1964 23.3 26.5        24.5   
1965  22.0       25.4   
1966  22.3     23.5  25.1   
1967  22.4       24.9     23
Year Denmark  France  Norway  Sweden  Switzerland UK 
USA 
(households) 
1968         25.0   
1969       25.2  25.3  17.7 
1970  22.9     22.0  24.2   
1971  23.2       24.2   
1972  22.7       25.2   
1973     22.5      24.2   
1974         26.0   
1975  24.6     23.6  23.8   
1976     22.8      24.6   
1977         24.3   
1978       20.4  17.0   
1979      23.6  21.5  17.0   
1980       21.8  17.0   
1981       19.7  23.6  18.0   
1982      27.5  19.7  18.0   
1983      26.9  18.9  17.0  22.3 
1984    25.1 24.6 19.5    17.0   
1985      24.1  19.5  18.0   
1986      24.3  19.1  18.0   
1987      24.7  18.8  19.0   
1988      24.3  20.5  19.0   
1989      24.0  20.6  18.0  21.6 
1990      24.2  20.7  17.0   
1991     23.9  22.2  23.0  18.0   
1992      22.8  22.8  20.0  22.8 
1993       22.9  20.0   
1994  23.3  22.3      20.0   
1995 27.0    21.9      19.0  21.8 
1996 25.8    21.9      20.0   
1997     21.8    23.2  21.0   
1998     21.1      18.0 21.3 
1999     21.2      20.0   
2000      20.9  22.7  21.0   
2001      20.9  22.4  20.0  25.8 
2002      21.5  22.3  21.0   
2003         19.0   
Sources: See the Data appendix. 
 
Second, while the series do not indicate a clear common pattern over the nineteenth 
century when industrialization took place (first in the UK, later in the US and France 
and towards the end of the century in Scandinavia) the development over the twentieth 
century seems unambiguous. Top wealth shares have decreased sharply in all countries 
studied in this paper with the exception of Switzerland where the fall has been small. 
The order of magnitude seems to be that the top percentile has decreased their share of 
total wealth by about a factor of 2 on average (from around 40-50 per cent in the   24
beginning of the century to around 20-25 per cent today). It also seems that the lowest 
point in most countries was around 1980 and that the top percentile wealth share has 
increased in most countries after that. Even though the main decreases have taken place 
at the very top of the distribution, the next 4 per cent (P95-99) also experience 
decreasing wealth shares in all countries. 










































Sources: See Table 2 and the Data appendix. 
 
3 Concluding  discussion 
So what can be said about the relationship between wealth concentration and economic 
development based on the data provided in this paper? Is there a common pattern across 
countries over the path of development? Have initial wealth inequalities been amplified 
or reduced? Our reading of the data suggests that industrialization was not 
unambiguously accompanied by increasing wealth inequality. While inequality did 
increase in the UK, the US and in France, it probably did not change much in Sweden 
and even decreased slightly in Norway and in Denmark. Noting that the countries in the 
first group all were large, central economies which were early to industrialize, while the 
Scandinavian countries all were small peripheral economies which industrialized much 
later, may hold clues to the different experiences but it does not change the fact that 
industrialization did not increase wealth concentration everywhere.  
 
The twentieth century experience seems much more homogenous. As the countries 
continued to develop top wealth concentration also dropped substantially. Looking at 
the details of the pattern by which different fractiles gain wealth shares seem to indicate 
this drop was due to a gradual process of wealth spreading in the population—
confirming the increase of ‘popular wealth’ identified in, e.g., Atkinson and Harrison   25
(1978). In a sense this pattern is consistent with a Kuznets-type process where 
inequality eventually decreases as the whole economy becomes developed. However, it 
has recently been suggested that this development was probably not driven by such a 
process, but mainly by exogenous events. Piketty et al. (2006) argue in the case of 
France that it was mainly adverse shocks to top wealth during the period 1914-45, 
mainly in the form of the world wars, which decreased French wealth inequality, and 
that the subsequent introduction of redistributive policies that prevented them from 
recovering. A similar explanation is given by Kopczuk and Saez (2004) for the US. This 
line of reasoning has been supported by the fact that Switzerland, which did not take 
part in either of the wars exhibits rather stable top wealth shares. Our data on Sweden, 
which also did not participate in any of the world wars, shows an example of 
equalization taking place without decreases in top wealth shares driven by exogenous 
shocks. Even though events such as the Kreuger-crash in 1932 hit top wealth holders in 
Sweden as well, this does not explain the entire drop. This suggests that policy, at least 
in the case of Sweden, has played a more active role in equalizing wealth than merely 
holding back the creation of new fortunes after the Second World War. Suggesting that 
rising taxation and increased redistribution has been important for the decline of wealth 
inequality is also consistent with the largest drops taking place in the Scandinavian 
countries as well as with the smaller decline in Switzerland, with its smaller 
government. 
 
Overall the data, hence, seems to suggest that (1) there was a mixed impact of 
industrialization and (2) in later stages, after countries became industrial, significant 
wealth-holding spread to wider and wider groups, bringing wealth inequality down. In 
terms of the often discussed inverse U-shape over the path of development the first 
upward part does not seem to be present everywhere, while the later stage decrease in 
inequality does fit all countries we have studied. An important addition to this 
characterization is that this analogy misses an important point which is present in the 
series. While the inverse U-shape suggests that the distribution of wealth starts at some 
level in a non-industrialized society, then rises, and later returns to the same level of 
inequality, all our series indicate that development has unambiguously lowered wealth 
concentration. The proper characterization of wealth inequality over the path of 
development hence seems to be that it follows an inverse J-shape with wealth being 
more equally distributed today than before industrialization started.    26
Data appendix 
Table A1: List of sources and data definitions of wealth distribution data 
Country Year(s)  Wealth  holder  unit  Source 
Denmark  1789  males > 19 years  Soltow (1985: table 4) 
  1908-25  households  Zeuthen (1928: table IV 4: 521) 
 1939, 
1944, 1949 
households  Bjerke (1956: table 32) 
 1950-75  households  Statistics  Denmark,  Statistisk Årbog 
 1995-96  households  Statistics  Denmark (1995, 1996: table 2) 
France  1807-1994  adults  Piketty et al. (2004: table A3, A7) 
Norway  1789  households  Soltow (1980: table 3) 
  1868  households (?)  Mohn (1873: 10, 30) 
  1912  households  Statistics Norway (1915a: 6*, 20*-21*) 
  1930  households  Statistics Norway (1934: 63*f) 
 1948-2002  households  (1983-2002 
are adjusted individuals 
as described in text) 
Statistics Norway, Statistisk Årbok 
Sweden*  1800  males > 19 years  Soltow (1985: tables 4, 5,) 
  1908  households  Finansdepartementet (1910: 31) 
  1920  households  Statistics Sweden (1927), Census 1920 
  1930  households  Statistics Sweden (1937, 1938), Census 
1930 
  1935  households  Statistics Sweden (1940), Partial Census 
  1937  households  SOU (1942: 52) 
  1945  households  Statistics Sweden (1951), Census 1945 
 1946-50  households  SOS  Skattetaxeringarna 
  1951  households  Statistics Sweden (1956), Census 1950 
  1966  households  SOU (1969: 54) 
  1970  households  SOS Inkomst och Förmögenhet 1970, 
Budgetundersökningen 
  1975  households  SOU (1979: 9) 
  1978-93  households  SOS, Skattetaxeringarna, Statisktisk 
Årsbok, and Statistiska Meddelanden 
  2002-03  households  Own calculations based on the LINDA 
database (see footnote 28 for details) 
Switzerland  1913-97  households  Dell et al. (2005: table 3) 




adults  Lindert (2000: table 2) 
  1911-13  adults  Atkinson and Harrison (1978: table 6.1) 
 1923-77  adults  Atkinson  et al. (1989: table 1) 
  1978-2003  adults  Inland Revenue Statistics (2006: table 13.5) 
USA (P99-100)  1774  adults > 19 years  Shammas (1993: table 4) 
  1916-2000  adults > 19 years  Kopczuk and Saez (2004: table 3 2) 
USA (P95-100, P99-
100) 
1774  households (free adult 
men and unmarried 
women) 
Shammas (1993: table 2) 
  1860  households (free adult  Shammas (1993: table 2)   27
male heads of 
households) 
  1890  families  Lindert (2000: table 3) 
  1922-79  households  Wolff (1987: table 3, 1995) 
  1983-2001  households  Wolff (forthcoming: table 2) 
Note: List of sources and data definitions of the wealth distribution data used in Figures 8 and 9 and in 
Tables 1 and 2. See text for further descriptions of the data. *The definition of ‘household’ used here is one 
where individuals (aged 18 or above) and married couples count as one household (see the section on 
Sweden for details). Some of the data sources (such as the censuses 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950) report 
individual data. Which has been adjusted to fit this definition. As also noted by Spånt (1979: 86) such 
corrections make little difference for the estimated shares. 
 
Table A2: Data for Sweden 
Data series  Year(s)  Wealth holder unit  Source 
Estate data
1 1873-77  individual  Finansdepartementet  (1879) 
  1906-08  individual  Finansdepartementet (1910). For 1908 
there is also wealth data based on applying 
the estate multiplier method 
(Finansdepartementet 1910: 14-34) 
 1954  individual  SOU  (1957) 
 1967  individual  SOU  (1969) 
 2002-03  individual  SOU  (2004) 
Spånt  1920-75  household  SOU (1979: 9) (based on census material 
and special surveys on wealth distribution 
1966, 1970 and 1975) 
SCB  1975-97  household  Statistics Sweden (2000: 1) 
 2000  household  Statistics  Sweden 
Note: The data for Sweden displayed in Figure 7 consists of overlapping series based on different source 
material (estate and wealth tax material as well as censuses and previous studies). The sources for the 
main series are listed in Table 1. 
1Reference population is all deceased >17 years 1873-1954, and all 
estates for the years after. 
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